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IN THE SUPREME COUBT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondents,
vs.

JA}.IIES LOYD UNDERWOOD,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This case is an appeal from a conviction in the
District Court on the charge of driving a motor vehicle
during the period of revocation.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried de novo on appeal from City
Court in the District Court in Weber County, Utah, on
a stipulated set of facts and from a judgment of guilty
the Defendant appeals.
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RELIEJF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant seeks reversal of judgment and
acquital of the charges of driving during revocation.

STATE·MENT OF FAOTS
On the 11th day of June, 1960, the Defendant was
charged with operating a motor vehicle upon a public
highway of the State of Utah, U -204, in Weber County,
Utah, while his driver's license was suspended. That
at the trial of the case, it was stipulated that Mr. Underwood, the Defendant, was in effect driving a motor
vehicle at the time charged. (T-3) However, the validity
of the revocation of the Defendant's driver's license was
attacked at the hearing (T-3). The record indicates that
prior to being arrested for the present alleged infraction, Mr. Underwood had a six-month suspension for
moving violations (T-4), that six-month period of suspension had completely and fully run and at the conclusion of the period, Mr. Underwood went to the State
Capitol to the Drivers' License Division to secure a
return of his license (T-5). H'e was informed by the
Driver's License Division that they had lost his driver's
license somewhere in the Department and it would be
necessary to issue him a second duplicate license. ( T -5)
In order to receive the second license, Mr. Underwood
signed an affidavit, at the departments request, that he
did not have the original driver's license in his possession. He then received a duplicate license permitting
him to drive on the roads of the State of Utah. Hereinafter for the purpose of clarification, the lost license will
be referred to as the "original license" and the second
license issued as the "duplicate license". Thereafter
2
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the Defendant had a duplicate license in his possession
and the right to drive upon the roads of the State of
Utah. About the time the duplicate license was to expire,
Mr. Underwood received from the State of Utah his
original license which had the same expiration date so
that he had two driver's licenses in his possession, both
the original and the duplicate. (T-6)
Thereafter, Mr. Underwood for a second time received a second order of suspension for moving vio~
lations from the Drivers' License Division. At that
time he surrendered the duplicate license to the State
of Utah pursuant to tll.e order but did not surrender
the original license s1nce it had expired at the time of
the order. The Defendant then upon one occasion drove
his motor vehicle and was picked up and ultimately
cited for driving during revocation and at that time
displayed to the arresting officre the original driver's
license which was expired but which he had maintained
in his possession. This was, however, not the instant
charge. Upon receipt of notice by the Drivers' License
Division that Mr. Underwood had his original driver's
license in his possession, the State of Utah Drivers'
License Division gave Mr. Underwood an additional
year's revocation for making an alleged false affidavit
that he did not have a driver's license in his possession
at the time of receipt of the duplicate license. (T-8)
This, in spite of the fact that it was the State of Utah
Drivers' License Division who was responsible for the
error and it was the same division who had actual notice
of the fact that the affidavit was not false since the
original driver's license was in their possession at the
time. It was that year's revocation given to Mr. TTnder3
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wood for making a false affidavit that cause the instant
case since :Mr. Underwood ··was driving during that
period of revo'eaiin when ipioked ;up and charged. Mr.
Underwood received no notice of a :right to a hearing,
but ·was rather sent department driver's license order,
a·copy of which 'is found in the file, at page 14. Mr.
Underwood had further been ibefore Mr. Miller of the
Drivers' License Division and had been advised that
there was no reason for him .ever to return ·because it
would do no _good (T~14) and Mr. Underwood, in reliance
on what Mr. Miller said and on the wording of the
order which stated as .a past fact "it is hereby ordered
that the above described driving privilege and license
privilege and license issued to the above named person
be, and the .same are hereby revoked for the period of
one "year . . . your driver's license will be held for an
an additional year from the date -it is received in this
d~partment.;, No notice of -any_ right to hearing was
given, but rather Mr. Underwood was advised as a :past
fact that his license had been revoked.

POINT I. :THAT THE REVOCATION IN -QUESTION RErSULTED FROM AN E1RROR IN THE
DRIVERS \LICENSE DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES !DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE OF
UTAH.
POIN,T II. THAT THE NOTICE AND SUSPENSION, GIVEN THE DEFENDANT -BY THE DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION OF THE STATE OF
UTAH DID NOT COMPLY -WITH FUNDA1\1ENTAL
RULIDS OF DUE PROCESS.
A. SAID NOTICE MISLED THE DEFENDANT
·4
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INTO BELIEVING THAT HE HAD NO RIGHT OF
APPEAL.
B. SAID NOTICEi LEFT DAY8 BLANK AND
WAS IN EFFECT SO AMBIGUOUS TO GIVE THE
DEFENDANT NO NOTICE OF REVOCATION.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THAT THID REVOCATION IN QUESTION RESULTED FROM AN ERROR IN THE
DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES DELP ARTMENT OF THE 8TATE OF UTAH.
As set out in the record, the facts suggest that
any error in the case was the error of the State of Utah
through the Motor Vehicle Department and not the
error of Mr. Underwood.
It is submitted that it is contrary to any principal
of law and justice to punish an individual for the error
of the government through its administrative body,
the Drivers License Division. This was the type of
mistake that certainly could happen to any administrative agency but it is further the typ·e of error that
once having occured should be corrected by the Motor
Vehicle Division and should not result in a penalty being
imposed upon Mr. Underwood.
The present action comes to this Court based upon
the fact that Mr. Underwood did drive his automobile
during the period of the erroneous suspension. He is
now in the position that he is in jeopardy of punishment
for violating a suspension order which, had the Driver's
License Division been cognizant of its own acts, would
have never been issued.
5
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POINT II. THAT THE NOTICE AND S.USPEN~
SION GIVEN THE DEFENDANT BY THE DRIV·ERS LICENSE DIVISION, OF THE STATE OF
UTAH DID NO~ COMPLY Wr.UH FUNDAMENTAL
RULES OF DlJE PROCESS.
A. SAID NOTICE MISLEAD THE DEFENDANT INTO BELIEiVING THAT HE HAD NO RIGHT
TO APPEAL.
The uncontroverted record in the case indicates
that Mr. Underwood received notice from the State of
Utah in the form set forth in the appendix. That the
terminology of the revocation read as follows:
"It is hereby ordered that the above described driving privilege· and License issued to the above named
person be, and the same are hereby revoked for a
period of one year, beginning~-----------------------··-·----, 19 ________ ,
YOUR DRIVER'S LICENSE WIL,L BE HELD FOR
AN ADDITIONAL ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE
IT IS RECEVIED IN THIS DEPARTMENT."
"It is further ordered that you, the above named
person, shall NOT operate any motor vehicle on the
highways of this state during the period above set forth,
and that you forthwith surrender to this DEPARTMENT your said license (unless heretofore surrendered)
as in said Act provided.'
"This cause for such action is stated as follows:
MAKING OF A FALSE AFFIDAVIT."
The wording of the order as set forth clearly indicates that the revocation had taken place and that it
6
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was a past accomplished fact and contrary to the pro-

cedure in other Departments does not advfse the Defendant of any right to appeal but rather clearly misleads him into believing that the suspension was an
aceomplished fact and by its wording, to the layman,
does not appear to leave any door open for review or
appeal.
The Law throughout the United States clearly indicates that revocation by orders of this type must comply
with fundamental rules of due process in legal proceedings. As late as 1959 this Court in the case of
11/c.Anerney v. State, 341 P(2) 212 Utah: 1959 has made
the following pronouncement:
"For the guidance of the department of public
safety, we observe that if there is a request by
a suspended driver, he should have the privilege
of having witnesses subpoenaed in his own behalf. The department, in conducting its hearings, should substantially comply with the fundamental rules of due process in legal proceedings,
even though all of the particular formalities required in Court proceedings need not be met.
Though the applicant contends that in the
hearing before the department, he was denied due
process of law, we are of the opinion that the
provisions of the law are reasonable regulations
in the safeguarding of lives and property upon
the highway, even though a driver may have his
license suspended pending the hearing. The
right to hearing before the department and its
determination being subject to re-examination
7
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in the Court is sufficient to protect the substantial
rights of the driver."
There are numerous cases in which the rights to
a driver's license are discussed. Among those are the
following, to-wit:
Schutt v. Macduff
127 N.Y.S. 2d 116 N.Y. 1954.
"A license to operate an automobile is not
a gift or favor from a sovereign but it is a thing
of real value which may not be revoked arbitrarily and taken away capriciously. One possessing a driver's license and having the proper
ability and qualifications to drive an automobile
may not be deprived of his license without opportunity to be heard upon all possible issues of
law and fact. The statute declaring that a motor
vehicle operator is deemed to have consented in
advance to blood and chemical tests for the purpose of determining alcoholic content of his blood,
if test is administered at direction of police officer having reasonable ground to suspect such
operator of driving in an intoxicated condition,
and subjecting person to revocation of his license
upon a refusal to submit to tests is unconstitutional as denial of due process in absence of the
inclusion of a provision limiting its application
to the case where there has been a lawful arrest
and provision entitling the licensee to an ultimate hearing upon adequate record before the
final revocation of the license."
The Application of Goodwin
17 N.Y.S. 2d 426 N.Y. 1940.
8
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"One to whom the motor vehicle ·bureau
issues a ·license to drive :an automobile has a
.vested right therein which .cannot .be :taken from
him capriciously or arbitrarily. In .a proceeding
to revoke an automobile driver's license, a commissioner of motor vehicles has quasi judicial
functions, which he must exercise in a legal manner, one whose·automobile;licen£e is·-sought to be
revoked· on another ground than, his, conviction of
a crime has the right to be,confronted with witnesses and given 1the· opportunity-to cross-examine
his accusers at' a hearing: before the commissioner
of motors. Failure. to give. the accused 'an opportunity to be heard in his· own defense and to cross.examine .his .accusers violates. a basic right accorded to every .citizen. under .our .constitution."
1

Fake v. Macduff
116 N.Y.S. 2a 597.

"This .is a .proceeding for. the .revocation of
a motor vehicle operator's license wherein the
driver sought an order directing the commissioner of motor vehicles to show caus·e why an
order should not !be ·made comma:nding him to
annul and cancel his order. suspending petitoner's
operator's license.
·'The petitioner was entitled ~to .a ·judicial
hearing ·and not a m.ere ;inquisition~' "
"As. stated· by Justice Heffernan, written for
the Court in Sheridan v. Fletcher, supra:

'A ·licensee to operate a motor vehicle is a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

valuable one; it is a right of which no citizen
should be deprived except on clear and convincing proof warranting such drastic action.' "
"As stated by Justice Cohan, writing for the
Court in Kafka v. Fletcher, supra (272 APP 364,
71, N.Y.S. 182)".
'We also desire to call attention to the fact
that in a proceeding such as this where revocation
or suspension of a license is permissive, the
statute requires that the holder of the license shall
have the opportunity to be heard except where
such revocation or suspension is based solely on
a Court conviction.' "

*** Good cause must be shown to warrant
revocation or suspension of a license, based upon
competent, legal testimony. At such hearing
petitioner has the right to be confrontde by the
witnesses who testified against him and he should
be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine his
accusers.'"
N.Y. 1952
Ratliff v. Lampton et al
195 P 2d 792 Calif. 1948
"The question is whether the department was
authorized to revoke the license without giving
plaintiff an opportunity to be heard. The answer
is to be found in the pertinent provisions of the
Vehicle Code as amended in 1945 which were in
force and effect when the order was issued.
"We are not concerned with those provisions

10
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which make it mandatory upon the department
to revoke or suspend the privilege of any person
to operate a motor vehicle upon the highway
upon receipt of a record showing that he has
been convicted of certain specified offenses. V ehicle Code, Section 304, 307, 315, Sub. A 3. In
such cases the facts have already been determined in a criminal proceeding. A different
situation is present, however, where, as here, the
department just makes an independent determination of facts as a basis for its actions, and this
was recognized by the legislature in the detailed,
albeit somewhat confusing, provision of the 1954
Code relative to investigation, re-examination,
hearing and review. Section 315 provided that
a person was entitled to demand a hearing before the director within 60 days after notice of
suspension or revocation by the department. The
hearing might be held before the director or representatives appointed by him and was to be conducted as near as practicable according to the
rules of procedure governing civil actions. It
was further provided that an application for a
hearing should not operate to stay any action of
the department. . .
'There was no express provision in the Code
which authorized the department to revoke plaintiff's license without first giving him an opportunity to be heard, and where, as here, a license
can be revoked only for good cause, this requirement carries with it the right to notice and hearing as a condition to revocation unless there is
11
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a clear showing of legislative intent to dispense
with that right.'
... The fact that the Vehicle Code provided
for a revocation subsequent to the review does not
alter this rule. We should not imply llegislative
intent to deprive a person of this license without the prior opportunity to be heard unless
compelled to do so by the plain language of the
statute, regardless of whether there is a right
to an administrative review after revocation."
POINT II. B. SAID NOTICE LEFT DAYS
BLANK AND WAS IN EFFECT SO AMBIGUOUS
TO GIVE DEFENDANT NO NOTICE OF REVOCATION.
It is further respectfully submitted that the revocation order is ambiguous in that: (1) It states no
definite period of suspension but rather leaves the beginning date blank. (2) That it indicates the time to
commence the year of revocation from the date the
license was received by the Department of Motor Vehicles, while the license had long before expired and
was not in effect, a valid drivers license under any
stretch of the imagination. It is submitted that any
suspension time should run from the time the license
expired rather than from the time it was surrendered
to the Department since in force and effect it was a
useless piece of paper having long since expired.
It is therefore submitted that by reason of its ambiguous and, too, by reason of the date the suspension
was to start that the order itself should not be entitled
to the force and effect of law.

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the tenor- of this notice entitled
Order gave the defendant no notice of his right to
appeal and rather couched as it was in terminology of
the present ten·se, tended to mislead the defendant into
believing that he had no right of appeal. In light of
the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the first
cited case above, that fundamental rules of due process
should apply to this type- he-aring, it is submitted that
rathe:r; than due process, the Order itself suggests and
presents a misleading infe:r;ance that the defendant
had no righ to appeal. The Order itself, it is submitted was vague and ambiguo1iJ.,s in that it indicates a
revocation for a period of one year and has no beginning date that the- revocation is to run..
The ab0ve facts, coupled with the fact as stipulated
in the hearing before this Court that the defendant had
a meritorious defense to the action and who, as a matter of fact, rather than making a false affidavit, had
made a true affidavit and any errors committed in the
subject case were the errors of the State of Utah
through the Driver's License Division who is the moving
party in the matter.
It is submitted to the Court in conclusion that the
defendant was denied due process in the revocation of
his driver's license in that he was substantially misled
into believing that he had no right to appeal based upon
the wording of the suspension Order itself and the advise given him by Mr. Miller that under no circumstances
or event was he to return to his office. If, in fact, the
purpose of the criminal law is to deter future mis-

13
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conduct, then in fact, there is no purpose in proceeding
against a man in compliance with the Motor Vehicle
Code, when, as a matter of fact, the general offense
the man is charged with is based upon a mistaken order
out of the Driver's License Division and further the
mistaken order was based upon the acts of the Division
itself and not upon any misconduct of the defendant,
James Loyd Underwood.
It is respectfully sumbitted that for the reasons
set forth in this Brief, the present case charging the
defendant, James Loyd Underwood, with driving during
revocation, should be found in Mr. Underwood's favor
and a verdict of Not Guilty rendered.
Respectfully submitted,
C. C. PATTERSON AND
ROBERT V. PHILLIPS,
Attorneys for the Appellant
and Defendant
427 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah
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